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ABSTRACT The divide between interest groups and social movement studies runs deep, but present developments call 
for a renewed focus on the relevance of these analytical categories. Both of these two forms of collective action relate 
to organisations that are assumed to follow distinctive logics and strategies for political influence. This article aims to 
contribute to the debates on the analytical difference between interest groups and social movements by comparing 
their political strategies and addressing the relevance of the typology for explaining organisations’ use of political strat-
egies. The paper draws on a dataset resulting from a large survey among Swedish civil society organisations among 
which clear cases of interest group organisations and “old” and “new” social movement organisations (SMOs) were 
identified. The results show that the distinction between interest groups and social movement organisations has some 
analytical value when it comes to explaining the use of different types of strategies: e.g. direct lobbying and media-
based and protest-based strategies. Also, the distinction between old and new SMOs is shown to be relevant because 
old SMOs seem to be in a way “in between” interest groups and new SMOs suggesting that social movements tend to 
develop over time and to become more similar to interest groups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Interest groups and social movements follow distinctive logics and strategies, and 
we find extensive studies into how, why, and with what means interest groups or social 
movements seek to promote political or social change (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 
2012; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). These two sets of actors are claimed to differ with 
regard to form (formal organisations vs. networks of actors), primary goal (influence 
over political decisions vs. social and political change), and main type of activity (insider 
tactics vs. outsider protests) (e.g. Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 
2004).  
Present developments, however, call for a renewed focus on the relevance of these 
analytical categories. Social movement scholars have shown how social movements 
and activists not only use street protests and unconventional strategies for achieving 
social and political change, but also use more conventional forms of advocacy, not least 
because movements tend to turn over time into formal institutionalised professional 
organisations (Císař 2013).1 Interest group scholars have noticed how interest groups 
tend to diversify their advocacy portfolios, using both conventional and unconventional 
strategies to allow for political influence also in the light of changes in political systems 
and the expansion of social media (e.g. Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008; Binderkrantz 
2005; Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). As one classic interest group scholar noticed al-
ready two decades ago (Grant 2001), the traditional model of interest group behaviour 
had changed in favour of more direct, open, or even confrontational tactics.  
This article takes stock of these reoccurring debates in social movement and interest 
group studies and assesses and discusses the significance of the analytical division be-
tween interest groups and social movements and the extent to which such a distinction 
should be seen as categorical (“two different creatures”) or continuous (“two of the 
same kind”). We focus on the actual strategies of influence that organisations develop 
and to what extent such strategic efforts reflect the theoretical assumptions about dif-
ferent logics. This article tests the analytical relevance of the distinction between inter-
 
1
 What is deemed to be an unconventional strategy of course varies across time and space, if 
one by conventional means political behaviour that conforms to established institutional rou-
tines and norms. In most liberal democracies, peaceful demonstrations would today be consid-
ered as conventional in this sense. In this text, however, we use the term unconventional to de-
note overall protest-oriented strategies because such use of the term is still quite common – 
although contested – in the literature. 
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est groups and social movement organisations (SMOs) by comparing their use of dif-
ferent political strategies, controlling for relevant organisational factors such as wheth-
er the organisations are local or national and how many members and paid staff they 
have.  
The study draws on a national survey among Swedish civil society organisations, 
which includes answers from 2,791 organisations. Within the resulting dataset, we in 
particular analyse 483 organisations that we see as typical instances of interest groups 
and social movements, where the latter are divided into the categories “old” and 
“new” SMOs. Sweden is considered a particularly interesting context because it is char-
acterised by an advocacy culture (Arvidson, Johansson, Meeuwisse and Scaramuzzino 
2018) that has not only allowed civil society actors to voice critique against public ac-
tors and policies, but has also expected them to do so. 
“Large N studies” focusing on organisations are common in social movement and in-
terest group research. Surveys geared towards organisations are, however, much more 
common in the latter (e.g. Binderkrantz 2005; Dür and Mateo 2013) than in the former 
(see Klandermans and Smith 2002 for an overview). When large N studies of organisa-
tions are carried out in social movement research, they tend to use interviews rather 
than surveys (e.g. della Porta and Caiani 2009). Survey studies of SMOs’ strategies for 
political influence are thus quite rare in social movement research, while we find ex-
tensive literature of this kind in interest group research (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 
2012; Binderkrantz and Rasmussen 2015; Dür and Mateo 2012). This literature on in-
terest groups at times includes actors that might be considered as SMOs, but it tends 
to treat them on par with other interest groups (e.g. trade unions in Beyers and Kerre-
mans 2012).  
This paper suggests a novel approach by including and comparing a selection of in-
terest group and social movement organizations from a representative sample of civil 
society organisations. Methodologically, this article clearly draws on interest group re-
search, both in the definition and operationalisation of the dependent variables and in 
the independent variables included in the analysis. The article’s contribution should 
thus be seen in the light of testing the relevance of a (partly contested) theoretical dis-
tinction between categories of collective actors by systematically comparing cases of 
organisations that are seen as instances of one category or the other by addressing 
their use of different political strategies.  
The article proceeds as follows. We provide a short review of academic debates on 
interest groups and social movements with a focus on how these organisations and 
their political activities have been understood and conceptualised. After a brief de-
scription of the Swedish context, we present the method, the data, and the way in 
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which we have operationalised our model in the analysis. Finally, we present our re-
sults and a concluding discussion. 
 
 
2. Taking stock of social movement and interest group studies  
 
Social movements and interest groups play a significant role in liberal-democratic 
societies because they connect citizens and decision-makers, albeit using different 
means and having different aims. As argued earlier, scholars have debated quite exten-
sively the distinction between interest groups and social movements, and what seems 
to shape these debates is to what extent scholars claim these different actors to be dif-
ferent species or potentially as two of a kind. The distinction between interest groups 
and social movements has had particular significance for social movement studies, and 
two approaches seem to shape the debate, namely the categorical approach and the 
approach stressing continuity between different forms of organised collective action. 
 
Social movement research 
 
The categorical approach has long dominated social movement research, and sever-
al contributions have sought to identify how social movements differ from other forms 
of collective action. It is often held that they differ with regard to their mode of opera-
tion (Rucht 1996, 186) because social movements tend to use protest actions, while in-
terest groups tend to represent members in polities. For social movement scholarship, 
protest and contentious action is a key factor for distinguishing movements from other 
forms of collective action, such as interest groups or political parties, which instead 
primarily use institutionalised means of action (e.g. Snow et al. 2004). They also differ 
with regard to the resources they draw upon. Social movement scholars suggest that 
social movements rely on committed adherents and participants, while interest groups 
rely on expertise, money, information, and access to decision-makers as their main 
type of resources to pursue their goals. They thus differ with regard to their connection 
and relation to the causes and to the people or beneficiaries they speak for.  
Kriesi (1996) argues that interest groups are specialised in political representation, 
i.e. they do not directly rely on the participation of their constituents. SMOs might 
sometimes share some similarities with political parties and interest groups because 
they also aim to accomplish social change by political goals and activities, but do so 
with the direct participation of a constituency. The categorical account also emphasises 
that social movements and interest groups have different structural features because 
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social movements are constituted as a network of groups and organisations compared 
to interest groups that are mainly formal organisations. Diani (1992) moves one step 
further and adds a conflictual element when defining social movements as actors that 
are engaged in “… political and cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared identity” (Diani 
1992, 3). Elements of conflict and contestation as well as a shared collective identity 
distinguish social movements from interest groups, which are instead seen as formal 
and single issue-oriented actors with limited – if any – connection to constituencies or 
people. 
While these suggestions portray social movements and interest groups as two sepa-
rate species, another strand in social movement studies take a less categorical stance. 
Císař (2013) argues that social movements are the unruly sibling of interest groups. 
Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) make a similar suggestion because forms of collective 
behaviour might be quite similar “…in terms of interests and objectives they share with 
respect to some aspects of social life” (Snow et al. 2004, 7). Burstein (1999) further-
more proposes that the list of features often used to separate social movements from 
interest groups is less categorical and occurs along a continuum and that “… the ra-
tionale for locating the dividing point in one place rather than another is never made 
clear” (Burstein 1999, 9). Those arguing in favour of a sliding scale tend to stress that 
social movements often also include organisations and tend to develop over time: 
“They often become more and more institutionalized, with some of them evolving (at 
least partially) into interest groups or even political parties” (Snow et al. 2004, 8). A 
consequence of this institutionalisation can be that movements become more formal-
istic in terms of members’ participation, more professionalised, and more embracing of 
higher forms of internal organisational differentiation (Armstrong and Bartley 2013).  
As scholars have paid greater attention to organisations within movements, related 
to discussions on professionalisation, institutionalisation, or NGOisation (e.g. Jacobsson 
and Korolzcuk 2017; Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013), the distinction between move-
ments and interest groups has become less relevant. This is not only due to the effects 
of informal movements turning into formal organisations, but also due to adaptation to 
competitive political and institutional conditions. Ruzza (2011) finds that as movements 
engage in competitive political environments they tend to adopt classic movement tac-
tics like protest, pressure, and confrontation as well as consultation, participation in 
policy processes, and bargaining. Resource mobilisation slowly turns to external fund-
ing schemes. We find extensive conceptual innovation to capture the kind of actors 
that share resemblance with SMOs, such as advocacy organisations (Andrews and Ed-
wards 2004). Ruzza (2004) puts forward the notion of “movement advocacy coalition” 
to argue for the organisational hybrids that have developed and presents it as a kind of 
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intermediate actor that on the one hand resembles public interest groups in their activ-
ities, and advocacy coalitions in their form, yet retaining the social movement’s com-
mitment to a particular purpose or cause. 
 
Interest groups research 
 
We find similar dilemmas within interest groups scholarship, and the question of 
“what is an interest group” has occupied the attention of scholars (e.g. Baroni, Carroll, 
Chalmers, Munoz Marquez, and Rasmussen 2014; Císař 2013). Like many contested no-
tions, interest groups also have a set of related concepts like political interest groups, 
interest associations, interest organisations, special interest groups, pressure groups, 
or advocacy organisations. Very briefly, the term interest group carries a set of defini-
tional elements. It can be defined as a formal organisation and not a “… broad move-
ment and waves of public opinion that may influence policy outcomes…” (Beyers et al. 
2008, 1106). Although some interest groups might try to change social norms and be-
haviour, most seek to represent political interests and pursue political advocacy to 
push the political agenda in a certain direction. Scholars also stress that interest groups 
are informal and are understood as not seeking public office or engaging in elections, 
but pursuing their goals by interacting with politicians and bureaucrats.  
These short reflections illustrate that the political system, political institutions, and 
political processes are of key importance for interest groups, and their activities “… are 
largely focused on influencing policy outcomes, trying to force issues onto, or up the 
political agenda, and framing the underlying dimension that define policy issues” (Bey-
ers et al. 2008, 1107). While these elements suggest a clearly defined actor with certain 
aims, some interest group studies have focused on interest groups’ exchange relation-
ships with politicians and decision-making bodies where interest groups “…exchange 
their resources for political influence in an effort to maximize their own utility. In this 
view, how much influence interest groups can get in exchange for their resources de-
pends on political actors’ demand for such resources” (Dür 2008, 1214). Political actors 
will only exchange access and influence if they cannot produce these types of interest 
group resources by themselves. Most commonly, interest groups’ activities are equat-
ed with lobbying for political influence (Grant 2001, 2004) because it is assumed that 
interest groups follow conventional insider strategies rather than unconventional pro-
test strategies (e.g. Beyers 2004; Eising 2007; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Ma-
honey 2004; Marks and McAdam 1996). 
Interest groups studies have developed extensively in recent years, including inter-
est in new arenas for lobbying (e.g. the EU, see Beyers 2004) and cross-country com-
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parative studies of interest groups (e.g. Dür and Mateo 2012). Recent developments 
have, however, blurred the boundaries between social movements and interest 
groups. Discussions on interest group ecology have broadened the scope of actors and 
have enhanced studies into a wider set of actors than those only engaged in particular 
types of advocacy activities (see for instance Gray and Lowery 2000; Sorurbakhsh 
2013).  
Public interest groups, i.e. groups that promote issues of general public concern 
(e.g., environmental protection, human rights, and consumer rights), are treated with 
scepticism by interest groups scholars. Like SMOs, they do not fit into the standard 
manual of policy impact and mechanisms of consensus aggregation because they also 
have a propensity for conflictual stances and they are characterized by stronger identi-
ties and denser networks (Ruzza 2011, 457). However, some have addressed the coali-
tional elements of interest group activities. Although the focus is not on coalitions be-
tween interest groups and movements (e.g. Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015), there is 
a greater acceptance for the interconnectedness between the types of actors engaged 
in pushing for political and social change (see Holyoke 2009; Hula 1999). There is a 
common critique of interest group scholars being too much engaged in empirical stud-
ies and too little in analytical explorations (e.g. Beyers et al. 2008). 
Interestingly enough, some of the more recent attempts to reinvigorate interest 
groups studies have used conceptual inspiration from social movement theory. Binder-
krantz (2019) used the notion of “frame” to form the basis for analysis in her study of 
interest groups, thus expanding upon previous studies on the notion of policy issues. 
Some have introduced the notion of “political opportunity structures” to address the 
structural perspective of interest group strategies and activities alongside its extensive 
focus on organisational resources as the main definitional element to explain interest 
groups’ choices of strategies (e.g. Princen and Kerremans 2008). There are also exten-
sive discussions on the changing context, both in terms of how policies are being made 
and what tools are available, that have made interest groups and other advocacy or-
ganisations (NGOs, SMOs, and so on) more similar in terms of their action repertoires. 
The idea that interest groups mainly – or only – deploy insider tactics has largely been 
abandoned for a broader conceptual toolbox that pays attention to direct and indirect 
strategies for political influence, including both conventional and unconventional ways 
of seeking influence (e.g. Binderkrantz 2005; Binderkrantz and Kröyer 2012).  
Such wider focus on different types of strategies certainly challenges previous as-
sumed arguments of social movements as more prone to protest and using unconven-
tional tactics and interest groups as primarily engaged in insider lobbying. For these 
reasons new concepts have been developed to capture the increasingly blurred 
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boundaries between interest groups and social movements. Thiel and Uçarer (2014), 
for instance, use the term “interest NGOs” to capture the changing forms of advocacy. 
Others have argued that one of the reasons for the conceptual divide is a normative 
element involved in the separation between social movements and interest groups. 
Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008, p. 1110) suggest that social movements scholars “… 
go to great lengths to avoid the ‘interest group’ label because they associate this term 
with selfish inside lobbying”. Social movements come with a much more positive con-
notation of advocating for a particular type of society and promoting more and better 
democracy, while interest groups tend to be associated with negotiations behind 
closed doors and hence a threat to participatory democracy and forms of accountabil-
ity (e.g. Beyers et al. 2008). 
Because of the different normative understandings and expectations that are pro-
jected on interest groups and social movements, empirically testing the relevance of 
the distinction is also of importance from a more general societal perspective. 
 
 
3. Studying interest groups and social movements in national contexts  
 
The analytical distinctions flourishing in academic debates have differing relevance 
in various national contexts, depending on state–society relationships and the degree 
and forms of organising and mobilising. This paper addresses interest group and social 
movement-related activities in the context of Sweden. To carefully examine the rele-
vance of interest group and social movement categories in a particular context, we ar-
gue that it is important to both consider top-down (the state’s principles and govern-
ance arrangements vis-á-vis various social groups and interests) as well as bottom-up 
factors (the traditions and forms of mobilising and organising among civil society ac-
tors).  
Sweden belongs to a broader group of countries characterised by “corporatism”, i.e. 
a system of institutionalised contacts, negotiations, and joint decision-making between 
the state and organised social interests. The corporatist logic relies on the premise that 
citizens are able to influence public policies in two different ways – through voting in 
general elections (the “electoral channel”) and through membership in interest groups 
(the “corporate channel”) (Lewin 1992; Rokkan 1999; Rothstein 1992). Corporatist ar-
rangements imply that some organisations are given a special status because the state 
institutionalises its contact with them and elevates them to legitimate participants in 
public decision-making (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Pierre and Rothstein 2003).  
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Like in most corporatist systems, it is almost only the workers’ and employers’ or-
ganizations that have clearly been included and that have had close cooperative rela-
tionships with the Swedish state. An important exception to this overall “mainstream” 
approach has been the government’s relationship with some social movement groups, 
e.g. the disability and the senior citizens’ movements. These groups have been invited 
to participate in consultative bodies together with government officials and are re-
garded as reliable partners in discussions about adjustments and further development 
of largely redistributive welfare provisions (Feltenius 2004; Lundström 2004). 
Discussions on corporate structures and arrangements have waned in recent years, 
and the Swedish political system step by step has moved away from a corporatist logic 
(Hermansson, Lund, Svensson, and Öberg 1999; Naurin 2001). Since the early 1990s, 
there has been a transformation of governance in a direction where the voices have 
become more numerous, competition for politicians’ attention has increased, and per-
sonal contacts and networks have become more important at the expense of the tradi-
tional forms of corporatist-arranged consultation (Hermansson et al. 1999). This would 
suggest that the relationship between the government and organisations has adopted 
more pluralistic forms in terms of less institutionalised cooperation and that individual 
organisations are less embedded in the public structures and hence need to seek influ-
ence through a variety of channels. 
Swedish civil society has often been described as made up of “popular movements” 
(folkrörelser) with an emphasis on membership, fostering citizenship and social rela-
tions, and strengthening democracy (Amnå 2006; Olsson, Nordfeldt, Larsson, and Ken-
dall 2009). Among the most common examples of such movements, we find the labour 
movement, the temperance movement, and the senior citizens movement. Several of 
these movements have developed into large national federations and powerful actors, 
yet still relying on an associational structure and a broad membership base across the 
country. These movements have played a significant role because they represent 
groups of citizens, providing them with a collective identity and making their “voices” 
heard in policy-making and in society. They have challenged – and still challenge – the 
Swedish government regarding rights for various groups (e.g. workers, women, mi-
grants, and pensioners) and have been influential in pushing for their rights (e.g. 
Lundström and Wijkström 1997; Micheletti 1995). This has been a central aspect of the 
national political culture.  
However, a pro-state tradition and a continuous integration between the state and 
the civil society sector have institutionalised many of the popular mass movements be-
cause “… this is the type of organisation that has consistently been encouraged by 
State policy and the system of subsidies…” (Lundström and Svedberg 2003, 224). Even 
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if we can find SMOs in the Swedish context that are much less institutionalised, many 
large social movements have been incorporated into the policy-making processes and 
their organisations are often studied as “interest groups”, “interest organisations”, or 
“organized interests” (e.g. Christiansen, Nørgaard, Rommetvedt, Svensson, Thesen, 
and Öberg 2009; Feltenius 2008; Lundberg 2013).  
Several processes seem to challenge such models of organising and mobilising in the 
Swedish context. Papakostas (2004) highlights how Swedish civil society organisations, 
and especially new generations of organisations, to a greater degree than before make 
use of other organisations for resource mobilisation. They tend to a greater degree to 
depend on funds from both public and private organisations and have become less in-
terested in mobilising resources from individuals, both as members and beneficiaries. 
This process is often associated with a weakening representativeness of civil society 
organisations and an increasing dependence on other collective actors. Also, a shift 
from “voice to service” has been highlighted in previous research about civil society or-
ganisations’ role in the welfare state (e.g. Lundström and Wijkström 1997). Through 
privatisation and contracting out of services, publicly financed services provided by 
subcontracted private enterprises and civil society organisations have increased sub-
stantially in every welfare sector (Hartman 2011; Trydegård 2001). Such development 
has highlighted a shift from the advocacy function of organisations to the service func-
tion and from the organisational input in terms of membership to output in terms of 
what they can produce. Despite these processes, the Swedish advocacy culture is still 
characterised by an expectation that civil society organisations are willing and able to 
uphold a critical function in society towards public policy both directly in contact with 
authorities and by being visible in the public space (Arvidson et al. 2018). 
 
 
4. Method, data, and operationalisation 
 
The survey 
 
The present paper is built around a comparison of interest group and social move-
ment organisations in Sweden. By comparing the political strategies of these categories 
of organisations we aim at testing the relevance of such a distinction in the Swedish 
context. The study is based on a large quantitative dataset resulting from a national 
survey that received responses from 2,791 Swedish civil society organisations. The sur-
vey was carried out in 2012–2013 as part of the research program “Beyond the welfare 
state: Europeanization of Swedish civil society organizations” (EUROCIV). 
Johansson, Scaramuzzino,, and Wennerhag,, Social Movements and Interest Groups Compared 
 
363 
 
The sample for the survey was based on the government agency Statistics Sweden’s 
(SCB’s) register of Swedish organisations (Företagsregistret) that was used to get con-
tact information and register data about the organisations. The focus of the research 
programme was civil society organisations engaged in welfare issues and interest rep-
resentation. To cover such organisations, the sample included associations (ideella 
föreningar) and religious congregations (registrerade trossamfund). In Sweden, most 
civil society organisations register with the authorities as belonging to one of these 
categories, and “association” is the most common organisational form. 
The sample was further specified by including only civil society organisations that 
were classified by SCB as associations involved in “social service and care”, associations 
involved in “interest representation”, and religious congregations. These three types of 
organisations were chosen to allow us to analyse civil society actors that typically use 
advocacy to further their aims. We deliberately chose not to include other types of or-
ganisations – for instance, sports, recreation, and leisure associations – because we 
deemed these as not primarily being oriented towards advocacy.  
Among these registered associations and congregations, one finds local and regional 
chapters of national federations as well as the national federations themselves (most 
Swedish civil society organisations register their local, regional, and national bodies as 
separate associational entities). One also finds quite small associations that do not be-
long to any federation.  
Through these choices, the total population of organisations forming the basis for 
our study’s sample consisted of 80,015 associations, which represents approximately 
40% of formally organised Swedish civil society. According to SCB’s calculations, Swe-
dish civil society includes about 217,000 formal organisations (SCB 2010).  
Because the actual numbers of organisations differed significantly between the 
three types of organisation constituting our population, we decided to make a strati-
fied sample so as not to end up with insufficient numbers of cases for the smaller or-
ganisational types.2 Having used this stratified sampling procedure, we gave the three 
types different weights in the analysis so that the presented results of univariate and 
bivariate analyses would be the same as if we had analysed a non-stratified sample. 
The survey questionnaire was sent by mail to 6,180 randomly chosen Swedish civil 
society organisations belonging to the three types of organisations targeted in our 
study. SCB provided us with a random sample of these organisations. After three re-
 
2
 Of the 2,689 associations classified by SCB as associations involved in “social service and care”, 
we sampled 1,781 (66.2%); of the 74,462 associations classified as involved in “interest repre-
sentation”, we sampled 3,552 (4.8%); and of the 2,217 religious congregations, we sampled 809 
(36.5%). 
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minders, 2,791 questionnaires were returned. The final response rate was 51.3% after 
a number of organisations had been excluded because they had ceased to exist or 
changed their associational form or due to faulty postal addresses. The data analysis 
below includes only cases from the associations that answered positively to the ques-
tion about whether the organisation had had any activities at all during 2012. For more 
detailed information about the sampling procedure, see Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 
(2019a). 
The three types of civil society organisations described above were used to create a 
sample in accordance with the overall aims of our research programme. For this article, 
however, we group the cases of our dataset according to a theory-driven typology that 
more clearly correspond to this article’s aims. Thus, in our analysis we compare three 
categories of civil society organisations – “interest groups”, “old social movement or-
ganisations”, and “new social movement organisations” – on the basis of survey data 
from 483 organisations belonging to various sub-types of these categories. To focus our 
analysis on civil society organisations belonging to these three categories, we exclude 
the 2,308 cases in our original sample that do not meet the criteria of our typology. 
 
A distinction to be tested 
 
The present paper draws on the theoretical debates presented above and has an 
overall aim of testing the relevance of the distinction between interest group and social 
movement organizations in the Swedish context. To highlight the evolutionary dimen-
sion of social movements, and to include relevant aspects that characterise move-
ments created and consolidated during different historical periods, we also make a dis-
tinction between “old” and “new” social movements, which is common practice in so-
cial movement research. Whereas the former has often been used to label in particular 
the labour movement, but also other movements emerging during the 19th and early 
20th centuries, the latter has often been used to group the movements that since the 
1960s have emerged out of new forms of protests in most Western democracies, e.g. 
the environmental, the feminist, the LGBT, and the international solidarity movements 
(Buechler 2013; Wennerhag 2010). This division has not only been motivated by the 
period during which the movements were formed, but also, for example, regarding 
whether they relate to traditional left–right conflicts and identities such as labour and 
class or to conflicts and identities going beyond traditional socio-economic divisions, 
such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, etc. More relevant in this context is that the new 
social movements have often been regarded as preferring more decentralised and par-
ticipatory forms of activism and organisation, as well as more often using unconven-
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tional strategies to achieve political and social change, in comparison to the old social 
movements (Buechler 2013). 
The analysis presented here compares strategies for achieving political influence for 
these three categories of actors. Based on the theoretical discussions presented above, 
table 1 presents a typology of five central features that might distinguish interest group 
organisations, old SMOs, and new SMOs from each other. The five central features of 
the typology focus on the organisations’ overall aims, whether they aim to represent 
specific social groups and identities or only instrumental interests, what constitutes 
their main resource base, how they tend to organise, and their main strategies. 
 
Table 1. Typology of different categories of collective actors 
 Interest group organi-
sations 
Old social movement 
organisations 
New social movement 
organisations 
Aim Political influence Social change and polit-
ical influence 
Social change and polit-
ical influence 
Identity/representation Instrumental interest Social and political 
identity 
Social and political 
identity 
Resource basis Financial, administra-
tive, and professional 
resources 
Members  Participation and activ-
ism 
Forms of organizing Professional organisa-
tion 
Federation Network 
Strategies Conventional and in-
sider  
Unconventional out-
sider and conventional  
Unconventional and 
conventional 
 
Using the typology in table 1, we have categorized the civil society organisations of 
our survey sample by identifying different sub-types of organisations as belonging to 
one of the three categories. If the types of organisations did not clearly display any 
characteristics typical of the three categories, they were excluded from the analysis.3 
The operationalisation was mainly done on the basis of the overall characteristics of 
types of organisations in order to avoid grouping organisations into larger categories 
 
3
 For instance, we excluded all lifestyle associations (hobby, sports, cultural, scouting, fraternal 
orders, etc.), political parties, religious congregations, and social service-providing associations. 
From the organisational type humanitarian associations, we only included those organisations 
considered typical new SMOs (and excluded old and established NGOs such as the Red Cross 
and Save the Children and various well-established Christian charities). Both disability and im-
migrant associations were excluded because they did not fit our typology well. 
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on the basis of individual organisations’ answers to variables that we later test in the 
analysis. When operationalizing our distinction between old and new SMOs, we took 
into account whether various types of SMOs in general were established during the 
older phase of “popular movements” in Sweden or during the later phase of “new so-
cial movements” since the 1960s. 
 
Table 2. Types of organisations included in the analysis, divided into the three categories, and the number of organi-
sations included in the analysis. 
Type of organisation 
Interest 
group organ-
isations Old SMOs New SMOs 
Trade associations 44   
Professional associations (not trade unions) 20   
Homeowners’ associations 6   
Employers’ associations 4   
Business owners’ associations 4   
Other interest group organisations 33   
Trade unions   110   
Temperance associations (IOGT, AA, etc.)  58  
Senior citizens’ associations  65  
Tenants’ unions  1  
Women’s associations     84 
Peace, human rights, and international solidarity associa-
tions 
  22 
Environmental and animal rights associations   13 
LGBT associations   6 
Other new SMOs   13 
Total (N) 111 234 138 
 
When identifying types of organisations for this purpose, we relied on a classifica-
tion of all organisations in the dataset inspired by the SCB’s study about associational 
life in Sweden (Vogel, Amnå, Munck, and Häll 2003). Our classification was made man-
ually by assessing the main focus of activity on the basis of the organisation’s name, in-
formation given in the survey’s open questions about the organisation’s main goals and 
activities, and information found on the Internet (mostly the organisations’ own web-
sites). From our classification, we chose types of organisations fitting the typology of 
this article. For some individual organisations that were difficult to classify other than 
as belonging to very generic organisational types, we once again used the survey’s 
open questions (including information about what year the organisation was founded) 
to determine whether they fitted one of the categories used in this article. To identify 
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interest organisations, we especially considered whether the organisation sought to 
represent the interests of a specific constituency. vis-à-vis other actors (and not simply 
coordinated other activities within this constituency). 
Table 2 shows the different types of organisations that were ultimately identified in 
this process using our typology as being interest group organisations, new SMOs, or old 
SMOs. 
Organisational strategies (the fifth feature of our typology) have not been taken into 
account in our operationalisation because this feature coincides with our main de-
pendent variables, which we use to test the relevance of the theoretical distinction be-
tween interest group and social movement organizations. The analysis hence includes 
483 Swedish civil society organisations and test the following two hypotheses based on 
the theoretical discussion presented above: 
1. Interest group organisations use inside, lobbying-oriented strategies to a 
greater extent than SMOs  
2. Old and new SMOs adopt a wider set of strategies than interest group organ-
isations, including both inside and outside strategies and conventional as 
well as unconventional strategies 
The distinction between old SMOs and new SMOs allows us to address the under-
standing of the divide between interest groups and social movements as categorical or 
continuous, by developing a third hypothesis:  
3. Old SMOs are more similar to (or less different than) interest group organisa-
tions in their advocacy strategies than new SMOs. 
 
The analysis 
 
In the analysis, we focus on questions from the questionnaire that show to what ex-
tent the organisations make use of some specific strategies in order to influence Swe-
dish politics. Because the sample includes different organisations active at different 
policy levels (local, regional, national, and supra-national), these strategies might refer 
to different policy levels within the national polity, different policy areas, and different 
phases of the policy process. These questions were originally constructed to generate 
ordinal variables, thus making it possible for the respondents to indicate their degree 
of use of certain strategies on a Likert scale, with the response alternatives “often”, 
“sometimes”, “rarely”, and “never”. In order to focus the analysis on whether the or-
ganisations use the different strategies at all, we have chosen to recode these ordinal 
variables into dichotomous variables by combining all alternatives stating some degree 
of use of a certain strategy into one single value, which is then contrasted to the value 
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“never”. This analytical focus also allows us to use a binary logistic regression to ana-
lyse to what extent specific qualities of the organisations, including being classified as 
interest group organisations or old and new SMOs, increase or decrease their probabil-
ity of using different types of strategies for influencing politics. All mentioned differ-
ences between any of the three categories have been tested through post-hoc analysis 
to guarantee that they are statistically significant.  
 
5. Results 
 
Organisational levels and resource base 
 
Table 3. Organisational level and resource bases for the three categories of organisations 
 
 
Interest 
group organ-
isations 
Old 
SMOs 
New 
SMOs 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(N) Cramer’s V 
Organisational level 
       Local organisation 44 85 63 70 483 .403 *** 
Regional organisation 21 11 8 14 483 .147 ** 
National organisation 35 4 27 16 483 .390 *** 
Number of members 
       1–99 24 31 42 30 437 n.s. 
 100–999 38 48 34 43 437 n.s. 
 >1000 9 17 18 15 437 n.s. 
 Meta-organisation 28 3 7 11 437 .352 *** 
Number of employed staff 
       None 87 81 66 81 476 .164 ** 
<5 10 11 26 13 476 .146 ** 
5 or more 2 8 9 7 476 n.s. 
  
Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer’s V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% significance. n.s. 
= not significant. Percentages and Cramer’s V are based on weighted data, and N is based on the actual number of cas-
es. 
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First, we present how the different categories of organisations perform when it 
comes to a set of independent variables, namely organisational level, number of indi-
vidual members, and number of employed staff (see table 3). 
It is clear from table 3 that the categories of organisations differ when it comes to 
many of these variables. We find more local organisations among old SMOs than 
among new SMOs and interest group organisations. In these latter two groups we in-
stead find more national organisations. When it comes to members, we find organisa-
tions with a larger membership base (1,000 or more members) among SMOs than 
among interest group organisations. Meta-organisations (i.e. organisations that only 
have other organisations as their members) are, in contrast, more common among in-
terest group organisations. Finally, when it comes to the degree of professionalisation, 
we find that most organisations do not have any employed staff, but of those that do it 
is more common that new SMOs have employed staff than old SMOs and interest 
group organisations. 
Previous research shows that access to resources is relevant when it comes to or-
ganisations’ choices of political strategies. Accordingly, organisations with many re-
sources are usually keener to engage in street protest and inside lobbying, while out-
side advocacy is the preferred strategy for organisations with fewer resources (cf. Dür 
and Mateo 2013). The geographical level of the organisation also plays a certain role in 
the use of strategies. In a multi-level system of governance, it has been argued (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2012) that organisations tend to pursue political influence at proximate 
or nearby venues rather than venues that are located farther away. These variables 
have previously proven relevant for explaining the use of different strategies for politi-
cal influence among Swedish civil society organisations (Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 
2017; Johansson, Scaramuzzino, and Wennerhag 2018; Linde and Scaramuzzino 2018; 
Scaramuzzino and Wennerhag 2019b). Later in the analysis when addressing whether 
the category of organisation explains differences in strategies for political influence, we 
use these variables as control variables. 
 
Use of different strategies 
 
Now we address to what degree the three categories of organisations use different 
forms of strategies for influencing politics. Table 4 presents some concrete examples of 
the actual use of different strategies divided according to whether they focus on ac-
cess, information, or protest (see Beyers 2004).  
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Table 4. The organisational categories’ use of various strategies to influence politics 
  
Interest 
group or-
ganisations Old SMOs New SMOs 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(N) Cramer’s V 
Has your organisation used the following means to influence Swedish politics? Percentage for “often”, 
“sometimes”, and “rarely” (other alternative: “never”) 
Lobbying/insider strategies 
       Contact national politicians 47 52 66 52 455 n.s. 
 Contact state officials 43 39 61 44 449 .147 * 
Answer government com-
mission remiss 44 41 47 43 419 n.s. 
 
Participate in panels, refer-
ence groups, dialogues, or 
similar on national level 40 36 44 38 413 n.s. 
 
Advocacy/conventional strategies 
      Mass media 52 67 83 65 444 .210 *** 
Social media 36 44 75 46 430 .244 *** 
Protests/unconventional strategies 
      Demonstrations 13 48 52 38 460 .340 *** 
Petitions 27 62 39 48 433 .320 *** 
 
Note: The measure of association between the variables is Cramer’s V. * = 5%, ** = 1%, and *** = 0.1% 
significance. n.s. = not significant. Percentages and Cramer’s V are based on weighted data, and N is based 
on the actual number of cases. 
 
The first four strategies addressed are access strategies. The first two are forms of 
lobbying, i.e. contacting politicians and officials at the national level. The third strategy 
relates to the “remiss system” by which organisations have the opportunity to com-
ment on drafts of legislation, while the fourth strategy relates to the practice of forms 
of “collaborative governance” in which organisations are invited to participate in refer-
ence-groups, civic dialogues, and the like. For these access strategies we only find sig-
nificant overall differences when it comes to contacting national state officials, where 
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we find that new SMOs are more active (61 per cent) than both old SMOs (39 per cent) 
and interest group organisations (43 per cent). 
The second set of strategies includes conventional information strategies, which are 
pursued in the public arena by making claims and statements through the two chan-
nels of traditional mass media and new social media. New SMOs use such channels 
more often (83 and 75 per cent, respectively) than old SMOs (67 and 44 per cent, re-
spectively) and even more so than interest group organisations (52 and 36 per cent, re-
spectively). 
The third and last set of strategies includes protest-oriented strategies such as 
demonstrations and petitions. Concerning both strategies, we find that SMOs more 
commonly use them than interest group organisations do. There is no significant dif-
ference between new and old SMOs regarding their use of demonstrations as a strate-
gy. However, petitions are used more often by old SMOs (62 per cent) than by new 
SMOs (39 per cent). Interest group organisations use demonstrations to a much lesser 
extent (13 per cent) than both old and new SMOs, but interest group organisations’ 
use of petitions (27 per cent) only differs significantly from old SMOs. 
These bivariate analyses of our dependent variables seem to support our second hy-
pothesis that SMOs adopt a wider set of strategies than interest group organisations. 
For most of the variables, it is the new SMOs that most frequently use all types of ad-
vocacy strategies. 
The findings so far might of course be the result of systematic differences in other 
factors between the three categories, and not only because they are interest group or-
ganisations or old or new SMOs. For instance, the organisations’ access to different 
types of resources, e.g. a large membership base or many employees, might affect 
their actual use of different strategies to influence politics. Furthermore, the organisa-
tions’ main geographical area of activities might also affect their use of different politi-
cal strategies. 
 
Factors explaining differences in the use of strategies 
 
In order to test whether this is the case, we used binary logistic regressions to ana-
lyse what factors, besides belonging to one of the three categories of organisations, 
make interest group organisations and old and new SMOs more or less likely to use ac-
cess strategies (table 5) and conventional information and unconventional protest 
strategies (table 6). Because the bivariate analysis showed that interest group organisa-
tions in general made the least use of many of the advocacy strategies considered 
here, this category is used as the reference category in the regression models. The re-
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gression models also include the control variables of organisational level (using local 
level as the reference), membership size (using 1–99 members as the reference), and 
number of employed staff (using no employed staff as the reference).  
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, organisational category matters only for the first two lobbying-
oriented strategies. The regression analysis confirms that new SMOs are more likely to 
use such strategies than interest group organisations when it comes to contacting na-
tional politicians (odds ratio 3.8) and state officials (odds ratio 2.7). Old SMOs differ 
from interest group organisations only regarding contacts with national politicians. An 
additional analysis only including old and new SMOs showed that these differ only re-
garding contacting state officials (new SMOs being more likely to use this strategy than 
old SMOs). 
When it comes to access strategies, all control variables impact the regression mod-
els. In particular, organisational level is important and both regional and national or-
ganisations are more likely than local organisations to employ all four access strategies. 
It is most likely that national organisations use these strategies (odds ratios varying be-
Johansson, Scaramuzzino,, and Wennerhag,, Social Movements and Interest Groups Compared 
 
373 
 
tween 3.2 and 7.7). Large membership bases also make organisations more likely to 
pursue political influence through all access strategies except participation in panels 
and reference groups. Meta-organisations are also more likely to use some access 
strategies (such as contacting national politicians and state officials) than organisations 
with few members. Having employed staff also facilitates pursuing access strategies; 
however, the effect of having some (fewer than five) or many (five or more) employees 
varies across strategies. 
While the results from the bivariate analysis show few significant differences be-
tween the three organisational categories in their use of access strategies, the regres-
sion models show more significant differences. Table 6 presents four more regression 
models for the dependent variables that relate to conventional information strategies 
and unconventional protest strategies.  
 
 
 
The regression models for information and protest strategies overall confirm the re-
sults from the bivariate analysis. New SMOs are much more likely than interest group 
organisations to pursue information and protest strategies for political influence. Also, 
old SMOs are more likely to use most of these strategies, but not to the same degree 
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as new SMOs. Differences are largest for staging demonstrations, where new SMOs are 
much more likely (odds ratio 23) to do so than interest group organisations. Old SMOs 
are also more likely (odds ratio 8) to do this than interest group organisations are, but 
not to the same degree as new SMOs. When it comes to the use of mass media as a 
strategy, however, we find no significant difference between old SMOs and interest 
group organisations. In an additional analysis only including old and new SMOs, we find 
that the new SMOs are more likely than old SMOs to use all of these strategies except 
petitions. 
Concerning our control variables, we find that organisational level is of almost no 
importance for the use of information and protest strategies, while it is in general im-
portant for the likelihood of using access strategies. Striving for public visibility through 
different types of media and by staging demonstrations and organising petitions are 
activities apparently less bound by the organisation’s geographical level (see Johansson 
et al. 2018). A large membership base, however, facilitates such activities, and organi-
sations with more than 1,000 members are more likely to use mass media (odds ratio 
14), stage demonstrations (odds ratio 8), organise petitions (odds ratio 7), and use so-
cial media (odds ratio 6) than organisations with fewer than 100 members. The number 
of employees matters less. Significant differences are only found between organisa-
tions with no and few employees (fewer than five), and not for organisations with 
many employees (five or more). This shows that the use of information and protest 
strategies (apart from petitions) is facilitated by having employed staff, but only to a 
limited degree, and organisations with many employees apparently do not tend to use 
these strategies any more than organisations without any staff at all. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This article shows that the distinction between interest groups and SMOs has analytical 
value and that the typology has explanatory power when it comes to strategies for po-
litical influence. The results are confirmed also when considering organisational factors 
that have proven to be important in previous research about advocacy strategies. 
Our results support our second hypothesis because they show that SMOs not only 
use protest strategies (demonstrations and petitions) to influence politics to a greater 
degree than interest group organisations, but they also tend to use conventional in-
formation strategies (mass media and social media) to a greater extent.  
However, we find little support for our first hypothesis because SMOs do not differ 
systematically from interest group organisations regarding their use of access strate-
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gies. Only regarding lobbying towards politicians do we find that SMOs are more likely 
to use this strategy than interest group organisations. 
We chose to distinguish between old and new SMOs to test the assumption of 
SMOs’ progressive institutionalisation and hence the evolution of social movements. In 
a sense, this also allows for testing whether the distinction between interest groups 
and social movements is to be understood as categorical or continuous. Here, our re-
sults suggest that the answer to this question depends on which type of strategy we 
consider. When it comes to access strategies, the distinction between old versus new 
SMOs is less relevant than when looking at information and protest strategies, where 
the relevance of this distinction becomes more evident. 
Regarding most strategies, new SMOs differ more from interest group organisations 
than old SMOs do, which seems to support our third hypothesis. One could argue that 
these results support the idea that the distinction between interest groups and old and 
new SMOs rather should be understood as a continuum, placing old SMOs somewhere 
in between interest group organisations and new SMOs. 
These results give rise to different interpretations of the development of these cate-
gories of collective actors. A possible interpretation of this could be that SMOs tend to 
become institutionalised over time and to become more similar to interest groups.4 
While this might be the case, new SMOs also seem to have entered the terrain of in-
terest group organisations by diversifying their repertoire of strategies. Interest group 
organisations, however, seem to keep within their traditional logic, especially when it 
comes to their limited use of unconventional protest strategies. 
When it comes to the factors that are most important for whether the three catego-
ries of organisations use access, information, or protest strategies, our analysis has 
shown that organisational category matters, but it matters differently for different 
strategies. It is foremost for protest strategies such as staging demonstrations that or-
ganisational category matters strongly. In general, however, the most decisive factor is 
the organisation’s membership size, which has a relevant impact on the likelihood for 
an organisation to engage in any of the considered strategies for political influence. 
It has been argued (see Johansson and Scaramuzzino 2019) that in a digitalised soci-
ety shaped by the widespread use of social media, a logic of political presence and visi-
bility in the public arena becomes increasingly relevant and possibly intertwined with a 
logic of influence. This fits very well with our results suggesting that SMOs are more 
 
4
 This interpretation can also find some support in our data, at least between old and new 
SMOs. For the three analysed categories of civil society organizations, the median year of the 
organizations’ foundation was 1943 for old SMOs and 1990 for new SMOs, while it was 1982 for 
interest group organizations (Eta
2
 = 0.176. Median values and Eta
2
 are based on weighted data). 
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clearly adopting a logic of presence in the public arena through different channels 
while at the same time pursuing influence through access strategies. Interest group or-
ganisations instead seem keener to follow a logic of influence where presence in the 
public arena might be more instrumental towards influence than an end in its own. For 
SMOs, being present in the public arena might also be about upholding a collective 
identity and keeping in touch with the grassroots base of the organisation. 
These results are, however, dependent on our operationalisation of the typology 
and the way in which we have categorised Swedish civil society organisations consider-
ing their aims, forms of organising, resource base, and identity/representation. Fur-
thermore, one should also consider that the results are based solely on Swedish data, 
which is a national context long characterised by social movements being the organiza-
tional norm for seeking political influence. 
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